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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 “Look at the picture of this guy.  Do you realy [sic] need to do a backgroung [sic] check? 
One look and the answer shou;d [sic] have been ‘no, you can’t have a gun,’”1 wrote one 
commenter in the comments section following The Huffington Post article, “Jared Lee 
Loughner’s Mug Shot (PHOTO).” The commenter’s reaction to Jared Lee Loughner’s 
photograph illustrates the prejudicial effect of releasing mug shot photographs to the press.  In 
the photograph, a bald Loughner smirks directly into the camera.  As one publication described, 
“[h]e grabs the viewer with his eyes, looking straight ahead and not backing down or showing 
any sign of shame or remorse.”2 In 2012, Loughner plead guilty for shooting Congresswoman 
Gabrielle Giffords, killing six people, and wounding thirteen others in 2011 at a political rally in 
Tuscon, Arizona.3  
 United States courts have long recognized the prejudicial nature of submitting a 
defendant’s mug shot into evidence during trial.4  In Barnes v. United States, the court stated that 
the “double-shot” (front and profile) feature of a mug shot photograph “is so familiar, from 
‘wanted’ posters in the post office, motion pictures and television, that the inference that the 
person involved has a criminal record, or has at least been in trouble with the police, is natural, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 El Saltine, COMMENT to Jared Lee Loughner’s Mug Shot (PHOTO), THE HUFFINGTON POST (last updated May 25, 
2011, 7:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/10/jared-lee-loughner-mug-shot-photo_n_807042.html. 
2 Jared Lee Loughner mugshot disturbs viewers (PHOTO), GLOBALPOST (last updated Jan. 14, 2011, 3:21 AM), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/america-and-the-world/110110/jared-lee-loughner-mugshot-disturbs-viewers-
photos. 
3 Josh Gerstein, Media wins on Loughner mugshots, loses for now on search warrants, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2011, 
10:09 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0211/Media_wins_on_Loughner_mugshots_loses_for_now_on_search_
warrants.html; Michael Martinez & Kyung Lah, Loughner pleads guilty to 19 counts in Tuscon Arizona, mass 
shooting, CNN (last updated Aug. 8, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/07/us/arizona-loughner-plea. 
4 See Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509, 510–11 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also U.S. v. Harman, 349 F.2d 316, 319–20 (4th 
Cir. 1965) (holding that the admission of photographs, which were taken of defendant while he was an inmate at a 
federal prison, and which showed his prison number and other information, was prejudicial error and deprived 
defendant of fair trial where defendant’s character was not an issue); cf. U.S. v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226, 227–28 (7th 
Cir. 1967) (holding that witness testimony that merely characterized a defendant’s photograph as a “mug shot” 
violated the presumption of innocent until proven guilty and was prejudicial error).   
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perhaps automatic.”5  Some courts have guidelines that regulate the submission of mug shot 
photographs into evidence.6  For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit require prosecutors to 
prove a demonstrable need to introduce the mug shot photograph and do not permit photographs 
that imply a defendant’s prior criminal record and suggest the source setting of the photograph.7  
 While these guidelines discuss the admittance of mug shot photos to courtrooms during 
trials, they do not discuss the impact of releasing mug shot photographs to the media during an 
ongoing trial.  This Comment does not concentrate on the evidentiary function of mug shot 
photographs in courtroom proceedings.  Instead, this Comment focuses on how the release of a 
defendant’s mug shot photograph to the media affects a defendant’s privacy rights.   
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagree over whether releasing a defendant’s mug shot to the 
media violates a defendant’s right of privacy.8 The Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Free Press v. 
Department of Justice, held that disclosing mug shots to the media during “ongoing criminal 
proceedings in which the names of the indicted suspects have already been made public and in 
which the arrestees have already [revealed their visages in] court appearances” does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Barnes, 365 F.2d at 510–11.  
6 See U.S. v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 1978); see also U.S. v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 494–96 (2d Cir. 
1973).   
7 See Fosher, 568 F.2d at 214. In this case, the defendant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and assault with 
a dangerous weapon and argued that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence his mug 
shot from “an earlier and unconnected arrest[,]” id. at 208.  The First Circuit conceded that the Government proved a 
“demonstrable need” to introduce the defendant’s mug shot into evidence, id. at 215, but believed that  the 
photograph clearly conveyed the defendant’s past criminal record, because the prosecution did not “[]artful[ly] 
mask[]” the “familiar double–pose format” of a mug shot, id. at 215.  See also Harrington, 490 F.2d at 494–96 
(holding that submitting into evidence a defendant’s mug shot photograph associated with a prior conviction 
constituted prejudicial error when: the prosecution inartfully masked the mug shot; when the prosecution’s witness 
failed to identify the defendant in court; and when the defendant did not take the witness stand).   
8 During the publishing process of this Comment, a third federal court of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, issued an opinion on whether mug shot disclosures to the media violate defendants’ privacy 
rights in World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2012) (arguing that defendants 
have a“privacy interest” in their mug shots).   
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implicate those defendants’ privacy rights.9  On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit, in 
Karantsalis v. Department of Justice, held that mug shot disclosures during an ongoing 
proceeding implicate privacy rights.10  Both Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis discussed 
whether releasing a defendant’s mug shot photo to the press violated Exemption 7(C) of the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),11 which prohibits the government from disclosing 
records that could “reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”12   
 Releasing a defendant’s mug shot to the press during an ongoing judicial proceeding 
violates Exemption 7(C) of FOIA.  Defendants do not waive their right of privacy simply by 
appearing in a court proceeding.  Disclosing a defendant’s mug shot to the press after a 
defendant has appeared in court poses a unique privacy challenge.  A mug shot captures one 
particular moment in a defendant’s life and communicates a message wholly distinct from a 
defendant’s courtroom appearance.  In turn, releasing this mug shot to the press during an 
ongoing criminal proceeding negatively impacts the defendant’s personal privacy long after the 
end of the criminal proceeding.13  Thus, the long lasting effects of the release constitute a 
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  Courts must adopt a legal standard, 
which robustly protects defendants’ privacy rights under FOIA Exemption 7(C) against the 
countervailing public need for mug shots disclosures.14   
 Sections II through V of this Comment demonstrate how mug shot disclosures to the 
press during a court proceeding violate a defendant’s right of privacy guaranteed under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Detroit Free Press v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1996).  
10 Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1141 (2012).  
11 Id. at 501; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
12 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
13 See	  Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F.Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. LA 1999).  Plaintiff, a 
newspaper company, filed a request under FOIA to release a well-known businessman’s mug shot after he pleaded 
guilty to federal criminal charges, id. at 473–74.  The court held that even assuming a public interest justified the 
mug shot disclosure, such a disclosure violated the businessman’s privacy rights under FOIA Exemption 7(C), id. at 
481–82.   
14 See discussion infra Section V, Conclusion.   
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Exemption 7(C) of FOIA.   Section II provides a background on ways the public can legally 
access documents in government possession.  Specifically, this section examines Karantsalis, 
Detroit Free Press, the legislative history of FOIA and Exemption 7(C), and First Amendment 
rights to access government information.  Section III analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of 
privacy as a legal right by discussing Supreme Court and common law tort jurisprudence on 
privacy.  These legal theories are helpful in defining the privacy interests under FOIA that 
protect mug shot photographs.  Section IV explores the impact that mug shot disclosures to the 
press has on privacy even after the end of a criminal proceeding.  In addition, Section IV 
presents social science evidence showing that any public benefit of releasing mug shots to the 
press is far from conclusive.  Finally, Section V concludes this Comment by discussing a 
possible solution to the conflict between the defendant’s right to privacy and the public’s right to 
know.   
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
A. The Purpose of the Freedom Of Information Act 
 The Freedom of Information Act allows any member of the public to receive information 
from federal government agencies.15  The Act, however, does not apply to the courts, to 
Congress, and to local and state government records.16   The seeds of FOIA grew from the 
emphasis on government secrecy during World War II and from the activities of Senator Joseph  
McCarthy.17  President Lyndon B. Johnson signed FOIA into law in 1966.18 Before the passage 
of FOIA, an individual had the burden to prove a right to access government documents.19 Under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15OFFICE OF INFORMATION PROGRAMS AND SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFORMATION ACCESS GUIDE, 4 
(2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/128321.pdf; see generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
16 YOUR RIGHT TO FEDERAL RECORDS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE 
PRIVACY ACT, GSA, OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVICES AND COMMUNICATIONS FEDERAL CITIZEN INFORMATION CENTER, 
1 (NOV. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/right_to_federal_records09.pdf. 
17 112 CONG. REC. 13007, 67 (1966). 
18 NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/lbj.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).   
	   7	  
FOIA, however, the government must justify withholding information requested by an 
individual.20   
 FOIA’s purpose is to compel federal government agencies to fully disclose documents 
requested by members of the public.21  FOIA, however, lists nine categories of information, 
known as “exemptions,” which permit the government to withhold from the public information 
that falls into these exemption categories.22   For instance, Exemption 7(C) applies specifically to 
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”23  Essentially, while FOIA creates 
avenues to access government information, it does not create an unqualified public right to 
access this information.   
B. Sixth Circuit: Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice  
 In Detroit Free Press, the Detroit Free Press submitted a FOIA request for the mug shots 
of eight defendants who were then indicted and awaiting trial.24  The defendants had made a 
court appearance and their names appeared in public records.25  The United States Marshals 
Service of the Department of Justice relied on FOIA Exemption 7(C) to reject the newspaper’s 
request for the mug shots.26  To determine when a government agency can reject a FOIA request 
for mug shots, the court used a three-prong test that triggers the application of Exemption 7(C) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A Citizen’s Guide On Using The Freedom Of Information Act And The Privacy Act Of 1974 To Request 
Government Records, H.R. REP. NO. 109-226, at 3.  
20 Id. 
21 S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965) (stating FOIA’s purpose to “establish a general philosophy of full agency 
disclosure unless information is exempt under the clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court 
procedure by which citizens and the press may obtain information wrongly withheld.”). 
22 OFFICE OF INFORMATION PROGRAMS AND SERVICES, supra note 15. 
23 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).  
24 Detroit Free Press v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1996).  Note that this court opinion did not specify 
the crimes for which the eight defendants were awaiting trial.   
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
	   8	  
when requested information is (1) “compiled for law enforcement purposes[;]” (2) is “reasonably 
. . . expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy[;]” and (3) when the request’s 
intrusion of privacy is deemed unwarranted after the court “balanc[es] the need for protection of 
private information against the benefit to be obtained by disclosure of information concerning 
the workings of components of our federal government.”27   
 The court reasoned that while the mug shots were “compiled for law enforcement,”28 
defendants in mug shots “who were already indicted, who had already made court appearances 
after their arrests, and whose names had already been made public in connection with an ongoing 
criminal prosecution” could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy to justify withholding 
their mug shots.29  Specifically, the court explained, “the need or desire to suppress the fact that 
[an] individual depicted in the mug shot [was] booked on criminal charges is drastically lessened 
in an ongoing criminal proceeding such as the one precipitating the dispute presently before 
us.”30 Moreover, the court stated that “the personal privacy of an individual is not necessarily 
invaded simply because that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the disclosure of 
information in the possession of government agencies.”31  Finally, the court opined that even if 
releasing the eight defendants’ mug shots constituted an invasion of privacy, “a significant public 
interest in the disclosure of [their] mug shots” could, nonetheless, override the defendants’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy.32  Releasing a mug shot that patently revealed the 
government’s obvious error in arresting the wrong defendant would provide an example of a   
significant public interest that could override privacy rights.33 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Id. at 96.   
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 98.  
30 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97.  
31 Id. (citing Schell v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 843 F.2d 933, 938–39 (6th Cir. 1998)).  
32 Id. at 97–98.  
33 Id. at 98.   
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C. Eleventh Circuit: Karantsalis v. Department of Justice  
 In Karantsalis, the plaintiff, a free-lance journalist, requested the mug shot of Luis Giro, 
who appeared in court to plead guilty to securities fraud.34 The United States Marshals Service 
relied on Exemption 7(C) to reject the plaintiff’s request.35  First, the court noted the difference 
in protocol for releasing mug shot photos between the Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit.36  
Although the court concluded that Giro’s mug shot photo was “compiled for law enforcement 
purposes,”37 it ultimately held that releasing Giro’s mug shot photograph “would be an 
unwarranted invasion of his personal privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C)[.]”38  The plaintiff 
argued that Giro’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable because of his appearance in court to 
plead guilty, but the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim and noted that “a booking photograph 
does more than suggest guilt; it raises a unique privacy interest because it captures an 
embarrassing moment that is not normally exposed to the public eye.”39  Finally, the court 
explained, “the public obtains no discernable interest from viewing the booking photographs, 
except perhaps the negligible value of satisfying voyeuristic curiosities.”40    
D. Legislative History of FOIA and Exemption 7(C) 
1. Legislative History of FOIA 
 The legislative history of FOIA does not completely support the press’s right to access 
mug shot photographs.  Although FOIA creates a presumption of openness for government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 499, 503 (11th Cir. 2011). 
35 Id. at 499. 
36 Id. at 501 (explaining that in some circumstances, the Sixth Circuit permits the United States Marshals Service to 
disclose mug shot photographs, even when such a disclosure does not serve a law enforcement purpose.  The 
Eleventh Circuit, however, only allows the disclosure of mug shot photographs for a law enforcement purpose.  The 
only law enforcement purpose that the Eleventh Circuit recognizes for releasing a mug shot photograph is to address 
issues involving a fugitive.  In this case, Giro was not a fugitive).  
37 Id. at 502. 
38 Id. at 504.   
39 Id. at 503. 
40 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504.  
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documents, it also recognizes that important privacy rights can trump this presumption.  A 1965 
Senate report introducing FOIA recognized the need to protect certain “important rights of 
privacy with respect to certain information in Government files[.]”41 Similarly, House 
Representative Robert Dole believed that while a healthy democracy cannot accommodate 
secrecy, the government must be “realistic” and “recognize that certain Government information 
must be protected and that the right of individual privacy must be respected.”42  In fact, the 1965 
Senate report that introduced FOIA clarified that balancing privacy interests with the public’s 
right to know is neither an easy nor impossible task, and observed that “to protect one of the 
interests, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated.”43  
Accordingly, FOIA recognizes the possibility that the interest of full disclosure may be 
“abrogated” for the interest of a defendant’s privacy rights in withholding mug shot photographs 
from the press. 
2. Legislative History of FOIA Exemption 7(C) 
 The legislative history of FOIA, together with the history of Exemption 7(C), weighs 
against the disclosure of a defendant’s mug shot to the public.  In the 1967 version of FOIA, 
Exemption 7 protected “investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the 
extent available by law to a party other than an agency.”44  The 1967 wording of Exemption 7, 
however, was too expansive and allowed the government to withhold a broad category of 
information.45  Thus, in 1974, Congress amended FOIA and added six specific categories of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38 (1965).  
42 112 CONG. REC. 13007, 74 (1966).  
43 S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38.  
44 Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C) (2009)). 
45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE, 2004 EDITION: EXEMPTION 7, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption7.htm. 
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information to which Exemption 7 applied.46  One of those six categories, Exemption 7(C), 
allowed the government to withhold “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would . . . constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”47  In 1986, Congress amended Exemption 7(C) 
once again and broadened its scope of protection for personal privacy.48  This amendment of 
Exemption 7(C), along with other FOIA amendments, was a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986.49  The 1986 amendments were in response to studies citing evidence that drug dealers used 
information from FOIA requests to learn about ongoing criminal investigations and to retaliate 
against informants who provided information to law enforcement.50 The 1986 version of 
Exemption 7(C) is the current version of the exemption, and it withholds “records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”51   
 The difference in the language between the 1974 and 1986 version of Exemption 7(C) 
illustrates the general trend of increasing the protection of personal privacy.  Senator Orrin Hatch 
declared, “FOIA contains an exemption that is supposed to protect informants, but even a quick 
look at that [1974] language reveals that the . . . protection is not sufficient.”52  Whereas in 1974, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Freedom of Information Act And Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (1974) (current 
version at 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C) (2009)). 
47 Id. 
48 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45.  
49 HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 
OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 55 (1999). 
50 132 CONG. REC. S14, 033 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“The language of our amendment 
addresses the problem which was the concern of the original proposal, the use of FOIA by sophisticated enterprises 
to learn about ongoing criminal investigations.”); 132 CONG. REC. S14, 038 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. 
Orrin Hatch) (listing studies showing evidence that drug dealers used information from FOIA requests to retaliate 
against informants).  
51 Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, §1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 (1986) (current 
version at 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C) (2009)). 
52 132 CONG. REC. S14, 038 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).  
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information receiving exemption from government disclosure “would” have to “constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[;]” in 1986, such information “could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”53  The “would disclose” 
language was a “dangerous standard” because it did not “clearly protect that information.”54  
Specifically, “[t]he FBI and other law enforcement agencies . . . testified that the ‘would’ 
language in the exemption place[d] undue strictures on agency attempts to protect against the 
harms specified in Exemption 7’s subparts.”55  Essentially, “would” implies a higher threshold to 
withhold information than the “could reasonably be expected” standard and thus shows 
Congress’s attempt to ease the government’s burden to withhold information.56   
 Additional evidence of the intent to increase privacy protection comes from the contrast 
between Exemption 7(C)’s application solely to “investigatory” records of law enforcement in 
1974 and the exemption’s application to “records or information” of law enforcement in 1986.   
Senator Hatch explained the problem with the 1974 FOIA language: “[i]f a request would 
disclose an informant’s identity, but is not an investigatory record, it must be disclosed. . . . Is 
this the kind of protection that our informants deserve [?]”57  The replacement of “investigatory” 
records with “records or information” effectively expanded the scope of the exemption and 
guaranteed that Exemption 7 protected sensitive law enforcement information regardless of the 
specific format or record through which the agency maintained the information.58  The 1986 
language change is noteworthy, because law enforcement records often contain the names of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Freedom of Information Act And Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (1974) (current 
version at 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C) (2009)); 100 Stat. at 3207-48.   
54 132 CONG. REC. S14, 039 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).  
55 132 CONG. REC. H.94, 66 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Reps. Glenn English & Thomas Kindness). 
56 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45. 
57 132 CONG. REC. S14, 038–39 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).   
58 132 CONG. REC. H.94, 66 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Reps. Glenn English & Thomas Kindness). 
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individuals who are not investigation targets.59  Names that appear in law enforcement records, 
however, elicit a strong presumption of wrongdoing.60  Thus, Congress recognized the need to 
protect the privacy rights of “innocent” parties mentioned in law enforcement records.  
 Finally, Congress’s intent to broaden privacy protection is especially apparent in the 
language in Exemption 6.  This exemption withholds “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy[.]”61  The “clearly” unwarranted invasion of privacy standard is harder to satisfy than 
Exemption 7(C)’s “reasonably expected” invasion of privacy standard.62  A 1986 Congressional 
Record stated, “[b]ecause exemption 7(C) and exemption 6 are nearly identical, it would be 
inappropriate to make any changes that increase the difference between these two privacy 
standards.  It is already easier to withhold law enforcement information on privacy grounds 
under exemption 7(C) than it is to withhold other information under exemption 6.”63 
 In sum, reading the legislative history of FOIA alongside the history of Exemption  
7(C) illustrates Congress’s intent to broaden the protection of personal privacy interests.  First, 
the difference in the language between the 1974 and 1986 version of Exemption 7(C) 
demonstrates Congress’s goal to ease the government’s burden to withhold information.  Second, 
Congress’s aim to increase privacy protections is further apparent by the differences between 
Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6.  The overall spirit of Congress’s drafting of FOIA Exemption 
7(C) does not support the release of mug shot photos to the press.  
E. The First Amendment Right to Access Government Documents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 7(C), 566, 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7c.pdf. 
60 Id. at 564.  
61 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2009). 
62 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 59, at 562.  
63 132 CONG. REC. H.94, 66 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Reps. Glenn English & Thomas Kindness). 
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 A discussion on how the public can legally access government information is remiss 
without noting First Amendment access rights.  Both Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis 
involved the press’s attempt to access information through a FOIA request.  Case law reveals 
that journalists cannot always rely on the First Amendment to access government information if 
a government agency rejects their FOIA request.64  Although the First Amendment states that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the press[,]”65 the Amendment 
does not guarantee the press an unqualified right to access information.  The Supreme Court, in 
Zemel v. Rusk, held that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained 
right to gather information.”66  In Houchins v. KQED, the Supreme Court further stated that 
“[t]he public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free 
Press, but the protection is indirect.  The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information 
Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”67  Effectively, the media has a qualified right to access 
government information under the First Amendment.   
 The qualified First Amendment right to access government information complements 
FOIA, because FOIA does not permit access to certain categories of government information like 
judicial proceedings and documents.68  The Supreme Court has spelled out many examples of 
qualified First Amendment rights to access judicial proceedings.69  Courtroom access is an 
example of a qualified First Amendment right.  In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the  
Court recognized a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials,70 but the Court has yet to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).  
65 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
66 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17.  
67 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14.  
68 YOUR RIGHT TO FEDERAL RECORDS, supra note 16. 
69 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. VA, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980); see Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of 
CA, Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1984); see Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 
(1978).  
70 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580–81.  
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extend this right to access civil trials.71 In addition, the Court has also announced a qualified First 
Amendment right to access court documents, like voir dire transcripts.72   
 Courtroom camera access is another example of a qualified First Amendment right.  In 
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court held, “[i]n the first place . . . there is 
no constitutional right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast.”73 The Court has 
allowed states to televise coverage of criminal proceedings in their courts.74 In Chandler v. 
Florida, the Court approved Florida’s experiment to allow electronic media and still 
photographic coverage of criminal trials.75 The Supreme Court, however, does not allow the 
media to bring cameras into its courtroom.76 Justice Antonin Scalia commented, “[i]f I really 
thought the American people would get educated, I’d be all for [televised courtroom 
proceedings.]”77 The Justice went on to explain, “[f]or every 10 people who sat through our 
proceedings . . . there would be 10,000 who would see nothing but a 30-second take out[.]”78 In 
other words, televising proceedings would create “a misimpression of the Supreme Court.”79   
Similarly, Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Sonia Sotomayor have also voiced reservations about 
allowing cameras to televise the Court’s oral arguments.80 These Justices’ arguments are 
noteworthy because they frame the themes that this Comment will discuss in Section III on why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Christopher Dunn, Column: Rediscovering the First Amendment Right of Access (New York Law Journal), NEW 
YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.nyclu.org/oped/column-rediscovering-first-amendment-
right-of-access-new-york-law-journal. 
72 Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 512–13.  
73 Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 610.  
74 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 560–61 (1981).  
75 Id. at 560–61.  
76 Tony Mauro, Let the cameras roll: Cameras in the courtroom and the myth of Supreme Court exceptionalism, 
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (November 14, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202532222249&Let_the_cameras_roll&slreturn=1. 
77 Dan Rivoli, Scalia, Breyer Weigh in on Televised High Court Arguments, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (OCT. 
6, 2011 9:07AM), http://m.ibtimes.com/scalia-breyer-televised-arguments-226289.html. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Tony Mauro, Sotomayor now opposes cameras at the court, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleSCI.jsp?id=1202588061400&Sotomayor_now_opposes_cameras_at_the_cou
rt_&slreturn=20130128184629. 
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certain information should remain private.  In essence, all of the examples of qualified First 
Amendment rights establish that the media cannot always claim a general right to access 
government information under the First Amendment.  Thus, the Detroit Free Press and the free-
lance journalist in Karantsalis cannot successfully rely on the First Amendment to access mug 
shot photographs.   
III.  DEFINITION OF PRIVACY 
 The decisions in Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis, as well as the language and 
legislative history of FOIA, leave one question unanswered: What is privacy?  Scholar John B. 
Young once commented, “[p]rivacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognized than 
described.”81  In other words, people are often unclear on what they precisely mean when they 
argue that their privacy needs protection.82 The Supreme Court’s position on privacy suggests 
that it is not a singular concept.  Instead, privacy is a multi-faceted concept and protects many 
categories of rights.83 Part A, below, presents a framework of privacy in order to guide the 
discussion on the evolution of this concept as a legal right.  Part B traces the legal history of 
privacy rights most applicable to mug shot disclosures.  A useful analogy for understanding 
privacy in this context would be the history of blackmail and privacy tort law.  Finally, Part C 
addresses cultural and social justifications for privacy laws.   
A. A Framework for Understanding Privacy 
 Because “privacy is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single essence[,]”84  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 HEATHER MACNEIL, WITHOUT CONSENT: THE ETHICS OF DISCLOSING PERSONAL INFORMATION IN PUBLIC 
ARCHIVES 9 (1992).  
82 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy of 
Privacy].  
83 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) (citing an implied constitutional right to privacy); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding a woman’s privacy right to make decisions on her medical care); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) (holding that wiretapping conversations on a public telephone booth 
constitutes an unreasonable violation of privacy). 
84 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 82, at 485. 
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author Daniel J. Solove argues that “privacy violations involve a variety of types of harmful or 
problematic activities.”85  Specifically, people “should understand privacy as a set of protections 
against a plurality of distinct but related problems.”86  In essence, society designed privacy as a 
protection against problems that hinder the activities which society values.87 Recognizing and 
understanding the various types of socially recognized privacy violations can help create a 
taxonomy for privacy that facilitates the development of privacy law.88  
 Such a taxonomy outlines four categories of activities harmful to privacy: (1) information 
collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.89  Each 
of these four groups covers specific categories that are harmful to privacy.90  For instance, 
“disclosure” is one of the seven specific harms to privacy within the “information dissemination” 
group.91  This Comment adopts this framework in analyzing the privacy implications of mug 
shot disclosures.  Specifically, this section examines “disclosure,” as this category is most 
relevant to a discussion on mug shot disclosures.    
 “Disclosure,” in the privacy context, involves “the revelation of truthful information 
about a person that impacts the way others judge her character.”92 Untruthful information 
undoubtedly impacts a person’s reputation, but some individuals may inquire why the law would 
protect against the disclosure of truthful information.  “Disclosure” laws aim to prevent 
reputational harms.93  “Disclosure” is an apt vehicle for analyzing the privacy implications of 
mug shot disclosures, because mug shots reveal truthful information of a person’s criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Id. at 480. 
86 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 171 (2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY].  
87 Id. at 174. 
88 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 82, at 483–84.     
89 Id. at 488. 
90 Id. at 490–91.  
91 Id. at 523. 
92 Id. at 491. 
93 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 82, at 529; see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S 
DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 9–10 (2007). 
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record and, as Section IV will discuss in-depth, mug shots also elicit reputational judgment by 
the public.  In truth, privacy and reputation are “intimately bound together[:]”94  
[y]our reputation, of course, is what other people think of you.  What they think of 
you is, obviously, a function of what they know about you or think they know 
about you.  Hence any study of reputation is also a study of the flow of 
information about other people—and the power to control that flow. . . . Many 
people earn and keep a reputation not because of what people know about them so 
much as because of what other people do not know.  For people with skeletons in 
their closet, reputation depends on secrecy and privacy.95 
 
Ultimately, laws against the disclosure of truthful information are based on the inherent 
connection between privacy and reputation, and mug shot disclosures perfectly illustrate 
this connection.  In fact, the history of disclosure laws reveals that lawmakers developed 
these laws because they recognized the strong link between privacy and social status.   
B. Development of Privacy Law Most Applicable to Mug Shot Disclosures 
 The historical origins of laws against disclosure reveal that the government designed 
these laws to protect against reputational harms.  Blackmail laws and privacy tort law show the 
evolution of disclosure laws and offer legal analogies for protecting against the disclosure of 
mug shots.  Blackmail law is an early example of a “disclosure” law, because it protects against 
the revelation of truthful information that could lead to reputational harms,96 even though it 
“involves a threat of disclosure rather than an actual disclosure.”97 Blackmail occurs when an 
individual extorts money or something else from another by threatening to disclose information, 
or rather, “skeletons in the man’s closet.”98  The following example in a nineteenth-century 
context demonstrates how blackmail laws aimed to protect reputation: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 4. 
95 Id. at 3-4. 
96 See generally id. at 10, 86–97. 
97 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 82, at 541.  
98 FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 97. 
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The blackmailer knows a dirty secret about someone.  He knows, let us say, that 
his banker, this pillar of the church, this leader of the community . . . fathered a 
bastard child.  The blackmailer threatens to tell the truth unless the banker pays. . . 
. Threatening to punish the blackmailer was no doubt supposed to deter him, but 
by the same token it protected the banker’s guilty secret.  Here, the law protects a 
“respectable” man who has broken the rules . . . . There is no point trying to 
squeeze money out of a pauper, or out of someone with no reputation to lose.99 
 
Hence, blackmail laws do “not protect the innocent but curiously enough . . . protect the 
guilty,”100 who wish to keep their guilty information private.   
 Author Lawrence M. Freidman contends that blackmail laws were an “example of the 
legal shield protecting reputation[.]”101  He inquires, “[i]n a society that exalts freedom of speech 
and freedom of contract and bargaining, even sharp and relentless bargaining, why do we have 
laws against blackmail?”102 Freidman posits: “Did blackmail laws actually deter? Doubtful.  But 
the point of the laws seems reasonably clear.  The blackmail laws were supposed to protect 
respectable people with guilty secrets.  The laws were supposed to keep the past safely 
buried.”103  Ultimately, blackmail laws function as privacy laws that allow individuals to 
safeguard truthful information that has the potential to ruin their reputations.  Mug shots are an 
example of information that is truthful, but harmful to one’s reputation.  Mug shots represent 
past “guilty secrets,” which most people want to keep private.  Blackmail laws protect against 
the disclosure of both truthful and untruthful information, because a blackmailer cannot claim as 
a defense to violating a blackmail law that he or she threatened to disclose truthful 
information.104  Nonetheless, blackmail laws essentially provide one type of legal analogy for 
safeguarding against the disclosure of mug shots. 
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100 Id. at 10. 
101 Id. at 99. 
102 Id. at 84. 
103 Id. at 98. 
104 FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 97. 
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 More notable than the promulgation of blackmail laws is Samuel Warren and Louis  
Brandeis’ 1890 Harvard Law Review article, “The Right to Privacy.”105 This article most 
famously articulates the privacy category of “disclosure” and provides legal reasons to prevent 
the disclosure of mug shots.  Warren and Brandeis were inspired to write their famous article by 
a non-salacious newspaper story on Warren’s daughter’s wedding festivities.106 In trying to 
discover a legal foundation for privacy rights, Brandeis and Warren began their analysis by 
recognizing the “mental pain and distress” that stemmed from the publication of true, but private 
facts.107  Solove explains that the “harms Warren and Brandeis spoke of are dignity harms.  The 
classic example of such a harm is reputational injury.”108  Warren and Brandeis wrote their 
famous article during the height of yellow journalism and the advent of the Kodak camera.109  
Privacy needed protection, because “[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have 
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed 
from the house-tops.’”110   
 Warren and Brandeis argued that the “existing law afford[ed] a principle which may be 
invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising 
press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for recording or 
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108 Solove, Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 82, at 486.   
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reproducing scenes or sounds.”111 The common law already “secure[d] to each individual the 
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others.”112 The right to privacy implied not only one’s right to inhibit false 
portrayal of private life, but to prevent its depiction entirely.113  This conceptualization of privacy 
fundamentally expresses an individual’s ability to control his personal exposure as a legal 
right.114   
 What remains peculiar is why Warren and Brandeis, men with good reputations, would 
be concerned with threats to privacy?115  Freidman argues, “although Warren and Brandeis did 
not say so (and perhaps did not even think so), no doubt some respectable people in fact had dark 
and dirty secrets to hide.  Even for these people, privacy—the veil of secrecy—was . . . an aspect 
of the social order that had to be protected.”116  For Warren and Brandeis, “[a]ny intrusion into 
the domestic circle would lead to scandal”117 and thus, privacy was “essential to human 
dignity.”118 
 In the context of this Comment, FOIA Exemption 7(C)’s protection of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy quintessentially represents the right “to control the conditions 
of our own exposure as a legal right[.]”119  Mug shots are prime examples of “instantaneous 
photographs”120 that capture a person’s “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions”121 at a particular 
moment in time and undoubtedly are photographs that most individuals would prefer to keep 
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private.  When the government prevents the disclosure of mug shots under FOIA Exemption 
7(C), it is ultimately controlling how others use private information about an individual.  
Specifically, pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(C), the government holds the power to prevent the 
media from using an individual’s mug shot and more significantly, to foreclose any reputational 
impact on an individual from such use.   
 The impact of Warren and Brandeis’ law review article on privacy and disclosure laws 
today is highly evident.  Tort law recognizes the potential privacy violation resulting from the 
disclosure of truthful information.122  Under the “Publicity Given to Private Life” tort law, the 
plaintiff must prove publicity of private facts “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and that 
are “not of a legitimate concern to the public.”123  This tort law enables individuals to sue another 
person for revealing true information about them, even if the other person obtained the 
information through lawful means.124  In addition, the Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe, 
embraced Warren and Brandeis’ article by recognizing a right to privacy based on the 
“individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matter[.]”125  
 Ultimately, Solove’s privacy framework, blackmail laws, and privacy tort law all 
demonstrate how privacy laws strive to address reputational harms.  These examples provide a 
legal justification for why mug shot disclosures implicate FOIA’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy,” because they show how the American legal system recognizes that privacy violations 	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123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).  
124 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 
967, 971 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Knowing Less].  
125 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).  Appellees, a group of physicians and patients, argued that a New 
York statute, which required Schedule II drug prescriptions to contain the prescribing physician’s name and the 
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State Department, violated their constitutionally protected “zone of privacy[,]” id. at 589, 598.  Specifically, patients 
argued that readily available information about their health would become publicly known and adversely impact 
their reputations, id. at 600.  The statute prohibited the public disclosure of the patient’s identity and permitted only 
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Accordingly, the Court held that the statute, on its face, did not violate an individual’s privacy interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters, id. at 599, 600.   
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stem from reputational harms caused by truthful disclosure of information.  In fact, other 
countries have laws that echo the design of American blackmail laws and privacy tort law.  For 
instance, in Argentina, the Civil Code prohibits “publishing photos, divulging correspondence, 
mortifying another’s customs or sentiments or disturbing his privacy by whatever means.”126  In 
Mexico, the Federal Civil Code “allows people to sue for ‘moral damage’ if one prints 
photographs of an individual that inflict ‘an injury in his sentiments, affections, or intimate 
life.’”127  Contrary to Detroit Free Press’s contention, the personal privacy of an individual is 
invaded when “that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the disclosure of information 
in the possession of government agencies.”128  Unfortunately, American privacy tort law is not 
an adequate protection for victims of mug shot disclosures, because victims must often suffer 
reputational harms before they can bring a cause of action.  Thus, in order to prevent reputational 
harms, the Supreme Court must hold that disclosure of mug shots violates an individual’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” under FOIA.   
C.  Why Should the Law Keep Certain Truthful Information Private?  
 While blackmail and tort law illustrate how privacy law protects individuals from 
reputational harms, sociological and psychological reasons justify why the law should protect 
against the disclosure of truthful information with the potential to harm one’s reputation.  Solove 
believes that “the value of privacy should be understood in terms of its contribution to 
society.”129  Specifically, “when privacy protects the individual, it does so because it is in 
society’s interest.  Individual liberties should be justified in terms of their social contributions.  	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Privacy is not just freedom from social control but is in fact a socially constructed form of 
protection.”130  Many scholars, however, criticize legal privacy protections and restrictions on 
the disclosure of truthful information.131   
 One general criticism of legal privacy protections is that they “inhibit a person’s ability to 
assess other people’s reputations and make accurate judgments about them.”132  For instance, 
Judge Richard Posner believes that the core issue in privacy law is whether individuals should 
have the right to conceal disreputable facts about themselves.133  Judge Posner explains: “‘when 
people today decry lack of privacy, what they want, I think, is . . . more power to conceal 
information about themselves that others might use to their disadvantage.’”134 By concealing 
truthful, but damaging information, people can gain advantageous footing in employment and 
marriage markets.135  Similarly, Richard Epstein, a professor at New York University School of 
Law, argues that privacy is often synonymous with the right to be disingenuous about one’s self 
to the public.136   
 The critiques on privacy are based on many faulty assumptions.137 The first assumption 
that critics make is that more information disclosure about a person will lead to a more accurate 
judgment about that person.138  Solove rebuts this assumption by illustrating that “the disclosure 
of private information can often lead to misjudgment”139 and by arguing that laws should sway 
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the way people judge each other.140  While having accurate information is essential when 
individuals must trust others with their finances and childcare,141 “[k]nowing certain information 
can [also] distort one’s judgment of another person rather than increase its accuracy.”142   
 Solove first tackles the question of “why should the law pay special attention to 
misjudgment based on private rather than public information?”143 Critics argue, “the problem of 
misunderstanding is not really a privacy problem because misunderstanding can occur with both 
private and public information.”144  Author Jeffrey Rosen, however, observes that “‘[p]rivacy 
protects us from being misidentified and judged out of context in a world of short attention 
spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge.’”145  Furthermore, 
“when intimate [private] information is removed from its original context and revealed to 
strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most embarrassing, and 
therefore, most memorable, tastes and preferences.”146  In sum, the critics are: 
correct that misunderstanding can occur in many ways, not exclusively through 
revelation of private information.  Just because this is so, however, need not 
tarnish Rosen’s insight.  Much misunderstanding occurs because of the disclosure 
of private information, and therefore, privacy is an important way of protecting 
against misunderstanding.  It may not be the exclusive way to safeguard being 
judged out of context, but there are many reasons why the disclosure of private 
information is particularly susceptible to misunderstanding.147   
 
 Reputation provides an example of how disclosure of private information is particularly 
susceptible to misunderstanding.148  Legal scholar Alan Westin argues that individuals must 
control information about themselves because they have contradictory roles to play in society 
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and must present different aspects of themselves at different times.149 A properly functioning 
society depends on everyone’s ability to deal with reputation’s precarious nature, but “[t]he 
reality is that people lack much control over how they are judged. . . . [and] managing 
disclosures about one’s private life is an even . . . more difficult burden[.]”150  Effectively 
speaking, privacy law that protects reputation benefits all of society.  As Solove explains, 
“[s]ociety accepts that public reputations will be groomed to some degree.”151  In short, laws 
must protect against the disclosure of truthful private information “not only because private 
information will lead to judging out of context, but also because of the value of preserving partial 
control over how people are judged[.]”152   
 Scholars are not impervious to problems with privacy law regulating reputational 
judgment.  For instance, UCLA School of Law Professor Eugene Volokh argues, “‘in a free 
speech regime, others’ definitions of me should primarily be molded by their own judgments, 
rather than by my using legal coercion to keep them in the dark.’”153 In other words, “[i]f people 
desire to make bad judgments about others based on partial information, it is their prerogative.  
What business does the law have in telling people how they should judge other people?”154  The 
first response to this argument draws an analogy to evidence law.155  Evidence law can exclude 
relevant evidence from a trial because “it is more prejudicial than probative.”156  Similarly, 
although certain information may help in assessing a person’s character, the law must recognize  
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that keeping such information private does not necessarily obstruct a fair judgment.157   
 Second, legal regulation of private information benefits not just the individual, but also 
promotes vital government interests.158  For instance, “the bright spotlight of the media can deter 
capable people from seeking public office . . . It can deter all those who have engaged in some 
deviant activity or who have a few eccentricities.  This has the result of de-democratizing the 
public sphere to a select group of individuals[.]”159 Overall, the law should regulate private 
information, because 
[m]ost people have embarrassing moments in their past.  Everyone has done 
things  and regretted them later. . . . There is a great value in allowing individuals 
the opportunity to wipe the slate clean.  Society protects against such disclosures 
not just to protect the individual, but to further society’s interest in providing 
people with incentives and room to change and grow.160  
 
Reputations need protection from the disclosure of truthful information and privacy law can 
provide this protection.    
 Finally, another faulty assumption by critics of privacy is that gossip provides an 
educational benefit in learning about human nature.161  While gossip in certain contexts has an 
educational value, in other contexts, gossip solely “satisf[ies] idle curiosity.”162  For instance, 
Solove strains to precisely identify the educational value in knowing a celebrity’s sex life or 
dating history.163  Moreover, in terms of private figures, “the educative function of gossip could 
readily be satisfied without revealing the identities of the individuals involved.”164 Many 
disclosures about a person’s private life are also made to people who do not need to judge that 
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person.165  Thus, disclosing private information is often unnecessary, rather than educationally 
helpful.   
 Ultimately, the justifications that scholars like Solove provide for why the law must keep 
certain truthful information private help give meaning to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
under FOIA Exemption 7(C).  In short, a reasonable expectation of privacy encompasses the 
right to control and protect one’s reputation.  Because private information often represents only 
partial information about a person, disclosure of such information leads to character 
misjudgments and, in turn, reputational problems.  Disclosing private information can 
disadvantage society.  The law must protect private information in order to protect society from 
these disadvantages.   
IV.  SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYSIS OF MUG SHOT DISCLOSURES 
 Mug shots can lead to negative misperceptions about an individual.  Social science 
research illustrates how the release of mug shot photos violates reasonable expectations of 
privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C).  Evidence suggests that mug shots create an unfavorable 
impression and diminish the public’s leniency towards the defendant in the mug shot.  
Specifically, three studies, respectively by Millicent H. Abel et al.,166 by Marianne LaFrance et 
al.167 and by Laurence B. Lain et al.,168 demonstrate how mug shots affect public perceptions.  
The results of these studies support the justifications in Section III for why certain information 
should be private. 
A. Mug Shots Carry a Negative Connotation by Diminishing Assessments of Leniency  
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 Mug shots lead to unflattering judgments and harsh appraisals of a defendant.  First, the  
Millicent H. Abel et al. study found that attractiveness and smiling affect people’s attribution of 
guilt and punishment.169  The researchers showed participants four photos depicted in a mug shot 
style.170  The four mug shots contained a male or a female with either a felt smile or a neutral 
expression.171  The researchers told participants a crime scenario in which the mug shot subject 
may have allegedly been involved.172  The researchers designed the scenario “to induce suspicion 
of guilt but not certain guilt.”173  Then, participants answered four questions that elicited their 
attributions of guilt on the mug shot subjects.174  Researchers next asked the participants how 
many years of imprisonment—from zero to sixty years—they would impose on the mug shot 
subject, assuming that the subject is guilty.175  This question measured participants’ leniency 
towards the mug shot subject.  Finally, participants rated the physical attractiveness of the mug 
shot subjects on a sliding scale.176   
 Although participants assigned the same level of guilt to both smiling and non-smiling 
mug shot subjects,177 the study found a significant positive correlation between guilt and 
leniency for the mug shot subject who the participants rated low in physical attractiveness and 
who was not smiling.178 The research summarized that “[i]f the target is unattractive, his or her 
smile may lead to leniency; whereas if the target is attractive, the target’s smile may lead to 
harsher punishment.”179  Therefore, “if a person is actually guilty and physically unattractive, he 
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or she should smile; whereas if the person is actually guilty and physically attractive, he or she 
should not smile.”180  
 Similarly, the Marianne LaFrance et al. study suggested that smiling affects how people 
attribute guilt and determine punishment of a person.181  Researchers gave the participants mug 
shots of a person exhibiting varying degrees between a smile and a non-smile.182  Researchers 
explained that school officials accused the person on the mug shot of cheating on an exam.183  
Participants then gauged the mug shot subject’s likelihood of cheating in the present scenario, in 
the past, and in the future.184  Researchers also asked participants the degree to which they 
believed that the mug shot subject should receive favorable judgment in the absence of full 
evidence.185  Finally, participants chose the degree of punishment the mug shot subject should 
receive – from no punishment to maximum punishment.186  The study found that, compared to 
those subjects who did not smile, “leniency (granting the transgressor more benefit of the doubt 
and applying a less severe sentence) was given more to smiling targets, even though they were 
not seen as more likely to have cheated in the past, present, or future.”187  Overall, “smiling 
transgressors received significantly greater benefit of the doubt and less punishment than non-
smiling transgressors.”188   
 Finally, the Lain et al. study illustrated that the nature of a mug shot influences readers’ 
perception of a news story accompanying the photo.189  Researchers gave participants a “neutral” 
newspaper story about which few research subjects could be expected to form a strong 	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opinion.190  The newspaper article contained a mug shot of a person with either a positive, 
negative, or neutral facial expression.191  One newspaper article, however, had no accompanying 
mug shot.192  Researchers instructed participants to evaluate how the newspaper article portrayed 
the story subject among fourteen qualities, such as “unethical-ethical,” “impersonal-personal,” 
and “antisocial-social.”193  Results showed that differences in readers’ appraisal of how the 
newspaper article portrayed the story subject were due primarily to the positive or negative 
nature of the mug shots. 194  Specifically, “mug shots can have a differential effect on the 
meaning newspaper readers attribute to individuals who are subjects of accompanying news 
stories.”195  The study states, “[t]hese results suggest that readers who can see pictures of news 
story subjects are quicker to ascribe personal characteristics to those subjects than are readers 
who have no such pictures.”196 and cautions:  
Newspaper editors, if indeed they are concerned with objectivity, should be aware 
of the impact of mug shots accompanying stories and exercise care in their 
selection. . . . Likewise, it is caveat emptor for the consumer, the reader.  As he or 
she strives to be an informed citizen, the reader should do well to remember the 
mug shot’s contribution . . . to the news story’s tenor and meaning for him or 
her.197   
 
 Ultimately, despite a neutral characterization of an individual featured in a news story, 
the nature of a mug shot of such an individual can ascribe a non-neutral (perhaps even negative) 
meaning onto a story.  All three studies show how mug shots create a prejudicial public 
impression.198  The research evidence foreshadows negative implications for defendants whose  
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mug shots appear in the press.   
1. Implications of Social Science Research on the Release of Mug Shots 
 The three social science studies illustrate the justifications for keeping certain 
information private.199  Namely, mug shot photographs can lead to misjudgment about a 
defendant.  Whereas the research above differentiates between hypothetical smiling and non-
smiling defendants,200 real life defendants will most likely not be smiling for their mug shots.  
Posing for a mug shot is not a celebratory moment.  Imagine taking a mug shot “after being 
accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties.”201  Clearly, a person generally does 
not have time to look attractive by putting on make-up, combing his or her hair, and wearing his 
or her best attire for a mug shot photo.  Rather, a person may look distressed, or even hostile, as 
he or she realizes that the camera will capture the pain and embarrassment of having a criminal 
record.  As one person explained, “[m]ug shots showcase us at our lowest point, stripped of all 
trappings that made us look like kings.  They reveal what we in fact are: Flawed, Possibly Drunk  
Human Beings in Bad Lighting.”202  In essence, mug shots capture only one moment in a 
defendant’s entire life span.   
 Although a photograph capturing one moment cannot accurately reveal any true 
characteristics about a person, research shows that people will, nevertheless, make judgments 
about a defendant in a mug shot.203  The social science studies imply that society will not judge 
real-life subjects of mug shots with leniency, given that most defendants will not smile or look 	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attractive in their mug shots.  These judgments are unreasonable, as they are based on impartial 
information about a person.  The Millicent H. Abel et al. study indicates that the public will not 
have a lenient attitude towards a real-life person who looks guilty in his mug shot.204 
Furthermore, the Marianne LaFrance et al. study suggests that the public is not likely to give a 
real-life defendant in a mug shot the benefit of the doubt, regardless of the defendant’s guilt.205   
 One possible argument in favor of releasing mug shots is that a criminal record, 
documenting arrest or conviction, has more of a negative stigma than releasing an unflattering 
mug shot.  This argument suggests that releasing a mug shot does not implicate privacy, because 
the public can easily access arrest and conviction records.  The Lain et al. study, however, shows 
that mug shots have an impact over and above having a criminal record of arrest and conviction 
in the first place.206  On paper, a crime may appear minor, but a really unflattering mug shot can 
exacerbate perceptions about the seriousness of the crime that a defendant committed, just as a 
negative mug shot can negatively color a neutral newspaper story.207  Common observations 
indicate that many people would not want to associate with a person who they deem has 
committed a serious crime.208    The Lain et al. research results show the power of an unflattering 
mug shot and how people can unreasonably magnify negative judgments of a defendant in a mug 
shot.209  Based on the justifications that Solove and other commentators voice for privacy, the 
Lain et al. results contradict Detorit Free Press’ contention that a defendant in a mug shot does 
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not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he or she has appeared in court.210  Mug shots 
uniquely implicate defendants’ privacy rights.  
 In short, social science research shows how the release of mug shots violates defendants’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  Recall that law enforcement takes mug shots of defendants 
before a jury convicts defendants of guilt.  Unfortunately, social science shows that mug shot 
photos are not judgment-free.  Most people publicize only their most flattering pictures, and hide 
their least desirable photographs,211 but mug shots are not representative of people at their best 
moments.  Congress amended FOIA Exemption 7(C) in 1986 to protect the privacy rights of 
innocent individuals in law enforcement records or information.212  Studies, however, indicate 
that the public will not give the subjects of mug shots the benefit of the doubt, a conclusion 
which is contrary to the idea behind Exemption 7(C)’s protections.   
 Not only do mug shots expose a moment that defendants prefer to keep private, but they 
also prevent defendants from controlling their reputations.  Mug shots implicate privacy interests 
because they represent incomplete information about a person.  In turn, people use this 
incomplete information to make snap judgments about defendants, which subsequently affect 
defendants’ standing in society.  People will view a defendant with a mug shot with suspicion, 
rather than with warm acceptance.  Releasing mug shot photos violates defendants’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy and ultimately violates the spirit of FOIA Exemption 7(C), as well as 
most other American jurisprudence regarding privacy. 
B. Mug Shots’ Effects Last Beyond the End of a Criminal Trial 	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 People’s negative attitudes—in the form of minimal leniency and diminished benefit of 
the doubt—toward subjects of mug shot photos impact defendants long after the conclusion of a 
criminal trial.  Specifically, three social science research papers, respectively by Tiffany A. Ito et 
al.,213 by Steven L. Neuberg214 and by Roy F. Baumeister et al.,215 show that people’s negative 
attitudes have great strength and longevity.  Research will summarily illustrate that mug shot 
disclosures violate FOIA Exemption 7(C), because the negative attitudes people form towards 
defendants in mug shots are intensely robust and last well beyond defendants’ courtroom 
proceedings.   
 The first study, through a series of experiments, found that people form a “negativity 
bias,” which the study defines as the “greater sensitivity to negative information” than to 
“comparatively extreme positive information,” as early as the evaluative-categorization stage of 
information processing.216  The evaluative-categorization stage is when people first process 
information into categories (e.g., negative, positive, or neutral) about a person or object that they 
encounter.217  In one experiment, researchers presented participants with pictures depicting 
positive, negative, or neutral stimuli.218  Researchers instructed participants to evaluate whether 
the picture “showed something they found positive, negative, or neutral.”219  As participants 
evaluated the pictures, the researchers measured the amplitude of participants’ late positive 
potential (LPP), which reflects the extent to which an individual processes the emotional 
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stimuli.220  The researchers hypothesized that “if the negativity bias operates at the evaluative-
categorization stage, it should manifest itself as larger LPPs to evaluatively negative pictures as 
compared with positive pictures.”221  The researcher’s hypothesis was correct, and results 
showed the “operation of a negativity bias at the evaluative-categorization stage of information 
processing.”222  To paraphrase, people are more sensitive to negative information than to positive 
information when they first form an impression of an individual by evaluating him or her.  Thus, 
this study suggests that people have greater sensitivity to a negative mug shot photo than to a 
positive photo of an individual.   
 In a second study, Steven L. Neuberg found that negative information about an individual 
creates a negative expectancy for that person.223 In simulated interviews, researchers gave 
interviewers negative information about one applicant (the “negative-expectancy” applicant) and 
no information about another applicant (the “no-expectancy” applicant).224 Researchers 
encouraged half of the interviewers to form accurate impressions about the applicants (the 
“accuracy-goal condition”), while the other half of the interviewers received no encouragement 
(the “no-goal condition”).225 Results indicate, “interviewers in the no-goal condition formed 
more negative impressions of the negative-expectancy applicants than of the no-expectancy 
applicants.”226  Meanwhile, negative information about an applicant did not bias the judgments 
of the interviewers in the accuracy-goal condition.227 Given that mug shots are an example of 
negative information in society, this study essentially predicts that the public will characterize 
subjects of mug shots from a visceral, rather than from a rational level.  The public is more likely 	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to make the worst assumptions about an individual in a mug shot, rather than make an effort to 
empathize or fully understand the individual. 
 Finally, a research survey reviewing studies across a wide range of psychological 
phenomena gives firm support to the proposition that negative information has a stronger impact 
on people than positive information.228 For instance, for the psychological phenomenon of 
impression formation, the survey affirms that, “[i]n general, and apart from a few carefully 
crafted exceptions, negative information receives more processing and contributes more strongly 
to the final impression than does positive information.  Learning something bad about a new 
acquaintance carries more weight than learning something good, by and large.”229 In its review 
of studies on stereotype formation, the survey conclusively summarizes, “bad reputations are 
easy to acquire but difficult to lose, whereas good reputations are difficult to acquire but easy to 
lose.”230  To state otherwise, bad reputations have great longevity.  The survey essentially 
recapitulates its findings through “the general principal that bad is stronger than good.”231 Thus, 
if an employer saw a mug shot indicating a negative characteristic of an applicant, and also 
learned that the applicant is a hero, a positive characteristic, then the negative characteristic of 
having a mug shot will contribute more strongly to the employer’s impression of the applicant 
than the positive characteristic of being a hero.  A defendant will face a difficult time eliminating 
the negative impressions that people form from viewing a mug shot. 
1.  Implications of Social Science Research on the Release of Mug Shots 
 The three studies indicate that negative salient features of a defendant’s mug shot remain 
in people’s minds long after a criminal trial has ended and easily overshadow any positive 
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information about a defendant.232  Not only do people form negative judgments of a defendant in 
a mug shot, but such judgments tend to be extreme and long-lasting.  In other words, judgments 
about individuals in mug shots are often unreasonable.  The studies ultimately provide evidence 
for why mug shots should remain private, because they exemplify the proposition that 
“[k]nowing certain information can distort one’s judgment of another rather than increase its 
accuracy.”233  For instance, in the Neuberg study, only the interviewers who were encouraged by 
researchers to form an accurate impression of applicants did not let negative information bias 
their appraisal of the applicants.234  In real life, however, individuals do not have researchers to 
encourage them to view a mug shot with an open mind.  Rather, studies ultimately suggest that 
people will react with hasty, overly emotional, and inaccurate judgments if they view an 
individual’s mug shot.235  
 The internet has only exacerbated the longevity of the public’s uninformed judgments 
about mug shots.  People can easily access mug shots through the internet.236  When people view 
mug shots on the internet, they are most likely viewing the photo of a stranger whom they have 
little interest in knowing accurately.  Solove discusses sociologist Erving Goffman’s theory that 
when people first meet an individual, they have little incentive to overlook strange or distasteful 
information about that individual’s private life, because “it’s easy to just walk away.”237  With 
time to become familiar with a person, however, “we’re better able to process information, see 
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the whole person, and weigh secrets in context.”238  Unfortunately, the people who “just walk 
away” can be potential employers, friends, and spouses.  
 Three hypothetical examples illustrate how irrational judgments based on mug shots 
impact the defendant, the defendant’s family, and society long after the end of a criminal trial.  
These examples show that the federal government should not disclose mug shots, because such 
disclosures overwhelmingly hinder the ability to control one’s reputation and thus violate one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C).  First, mug shot disclosures 
negatively impact individuals who are victims of false arrests and who are attempting to 
rehabilitate into society.  For such individuals, privacy is necessary to “further society’s interest 
in providing people with incentives and room to grow and change.”239  Lois Wilson, a victim of a 
false arrest, recounted the effect of having her mug shot posted onto a sheriff department 
website: “I don’t like that—that’s not who I am.  People look at you differently now . . . 
everybody is telling you you’re guilty.”240  The reactions that Wilson receives are not surprising.  
Education would not be completely effective in fighting the stigma that follows a public mug 
shot.241 For instance, despite the highly public campaigns educating citizens on AIDS, many 
people still make faulty assumptions about the causes of AIDS.242  Accordingly, even a 
disclaimer next to a mug shot proclaiming, “[t]his person is innocent until proven guilty” may 
not effectively eradicate a defendant’s association with guilt after his or her criminal trial ends.  
Furthermore, companies that remove customers’ mug shots from the internet often charge a hefty  
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price: one Florida woman paid $850 to remove her mug shot from private websites.243 
 Second, mug shots impact the privacy rights of a defendant’s family, thus illustrating the 
substantial (unreasonable) extent of privacy violations that stem from an individual’s mug shot 
disclosure.  Assume that a newspaper publishes the mug shot of a person whom a jury has given 
a life sentence.  One possible argument holds that a person with a life sentence already has 
enough privacy from society and thus, the release of this person’s mug shots has a meaningless 
impact on his or her privacy rights.  This person in prison, however, may have family members.  
Perhaps these family members have an interest in withholding the release of a mug shot.  The 
release of an incarcerated person’s mug shots implicates the privacy rights of family members.  
Penny Wood, a grandmother, provides an example of how the release of her unflattering mug 
shot affected her family.244 In a plea bargain deal, Wood agreed to let law enforcement publish 
photographs of her for a campaign to show the damages of methamphetamine use.245  Following 
Wood’s consent, however, her grandson endured the shame from the release of the photos.246   
 A defendant’s mug shot does not always accurately portray his or her family, but Wood’s 
example shows how people could judge an entire family from the mug shot of just one family 
member.  This inaccurate judgment is a prime reason why scholars like Solove justify the 
privacy of certain information.247  Note that the Supreme Court, in National Archives and 	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Records Administration v. Favish, held that FOIA recognized “surviving family members’ right 
to personal privacy with respect to their close relative’s death-scene images[.]”248  Only an 
illogical result would emerge if Favish’s FOIA ruling did not apply to family members of 
individuals serving a life sentence.  Innocent family members should not suffer privacy right 
violations for the mistakes of a close relative. 
 Finally, even individuals with criminal convictions deserve privacy protections once they 
have served their criminal sentence.  These privacy protections not only benefit the individual 
with the criminal conviction but also benefit society.  Suppose a jury convicted an individual of 
fraud and sentenced him to ten years in prison.  Also, presume that this individual is a “business 
genius.”  Finally, assume that the individual has learned from his mistakes during his prison 
sentence and hopes to become a contributing member of society after prison.  Despite this 
individual’s moral failings of committing fraud, he clearly has many valuable skills that he can 
contribute to the workforce.   
 Research, however, proves the existence of a stigma in having a mug shot photo, and 
demonstrates the strength and longevity of the public’s negative attitudes.249  Recall that mug 
shots can exacerbate perceptions about the seriousness of a defendant’s crime, thus creating a 
stigma over and above having a public record of an arrest and conviction.250  In turn, “people 
with stigma are often shunned or not fully accepted by society.”251  Accordingly, protection from 
mug shot disclosure “permits room to change, to define oneself and one’s future without become 
a ‘prisoner of [one’s] recorded past.’ . . . Society benefits . . . when people can rehabilitate 
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themselves and start new, more productive lives.”252  Unfortunately, studies suggest that if the 
government discloses mug shots, then defendants in those mug shots will not be able to change 
themselves in the public eye and will not be able to benefit society, even if they have immense 
talents.253  In other words, mug shot disclosures could lead to the “de-democratization” of society 
that Solove warns could result from the absence of privacy.254   
 In brief, social science undermines the Sixth Circuit’s contention in Detroit Free Press 
that the need to protect privacy diminishes in an ongoing trial where the defendant has already 
appeared.255  Specifically, social science supports the conclusion that mug shot disclosures 
violate a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C).  Mug shots 
need privacy protection, because studies indicate that not only will people make inaccurate and 
negative conclusions about defendants in a mug shot, but they will also hold those conclusions 
long after a criminal trial ends.  While attorneys, who are experts in public relations, guide their 
clients on how to behave during a trial, they are generally not present to remind their clients to 
take the “perfect” mug shot photo.  Thus, mug shots are the most candid portrayal of an 
individual at his or her most vulnerable moment.  The studies indicate how one negative mug 
shot can overshadow any “perfect” behavior during a trial.256  The negative impression that 
people form after seeing just one mug shot, however, is not always accurate.    
 When law enforcement releases mug shots, the public is able to invade the defendant’s 
privacy beyond a defendant’s trial and beyond a criminal’s jail sentence.  The American legal 
system promotes the principle that criminals who served their sentence have paid their debts to 	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society and should no longer reimburse society.257  Mug shots, however, are a permanent record 
of a private episode of defendants’ lives.  The invasion of privacy that results from disclosing 
mug shots perpetually affects a defendant’s rehabilitation into society and a defendant’s innocent 
family members.  FOIA Exemption 7(C) does not create an unlimited access to a defendant’s 
criminal record.  Moreover, FOIA Exemption 7(C) clearly does not condone the privacy 
intrusion of family members with relatives whose names appear in law enforcement records.  
Detroit Free Press’s holding quintessentially allows the government to transgress the boundary 
established by FOIA Exemption 7(C) to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.258  As Solove explains, the value of privacy lies in its value to society because 
“[e]veryone must cope with the fragility of reputation,” and society values privacy protections of 
embarrassing private information.259  Social science research shows how damaging mug shot 
disclosures can be to a defendant’s reputation.260  Talented defendants with negative reputations 
will undoubtedly find difficulty in contributing to society.  This difficulty from the disclosure of 
mug shots translates into a disadvantage for society.  Thus, mug shots need privacy protection.   
C. Mug Shot Disclosures have an Inconclusive Effect on Public Benefit 
 In their famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article, Warren and Brandeis articulated that a 
privacy law should: 
protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate 
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to 
protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having matters 
which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will.261 
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social science research indicates that any public benefit derived from releasing mug shot 
photographs is inconclusive, if not minimal.  Two popular arguments support the release of mug 
shots, but research does not adequately support these arguments.  
 Public shaming is the first theory that supports mug shot disclosures.  Law enforcement 
officials believe that publicizing mug shots will deter crime.  For example, one U.S. city 
considered posting DUI mug shots on Facebook.  The councilman behind the proposal 
explained, “[i]f it takes shaming people to save lives, I am willing to do it[.]”262  Essentially, the 
public shaming theory holds that the shame and embarrassment from having strangers see one’s 
mug shot will deter all members of society, including the mug shot subject, from committing 
crime.   
 Although posting mug shots will undoubtedly deter some criminal activity, “[b]oth the 
psychological and the anthropological works indicate that the general deterrence and expressive 
effects of shame measures are likely to be highly contextual and unpredictable.”263  For instance, 
some individuals commit crimes to support an addiction or compulsion, in which case, shame 
punishment may not be effective.264  In fact, some psychologists assert that shame is the root of 
certain crimes; thus, punishing an individual with shame is counter-productive.265  In addition, 
some psychological research suggests shame punishment causes anger and a drive to retaliate 
against the person administering the punishment.266  Conversely, research also theorizes that 
“[s]hame has a way of alienating people, inhibiting their ability to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
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themselves into the community.”267  For example, the stigma associated with shame punishment 
leaves criminals “with no hope of becoming a productive member of society,” “‘producing the 
feeling that improvement and change is hopeless.’”268  Essentially, the effect of using mug shots 
photographs for punishment is inconclusive.   
 The second argument holds that mug shots serve as public notice to people about 
criminals, such as sexual offenders, who live in their neighborhoods.269  Solove concedes that 
“information can be highly relevant . . . especially when a person with a history of violent 
criminal conduct has contact with children.”270 Under Megan’s Law, parents “have the right to 
find out the names of . . .  sex offenders, their photos, their addresses[.]”271  Mug shots may make 
it easier for parents to identify a neighborhood sex offender than by merely knowing an 
offender’s name and address from a sex offender registration list.  While shielding children from 
sexual offenders is a compelling interest, this interest does not always justify overriding privacy 
rights.  In fact, mug shot disclosures of sexual offenders may unnecessarily invade privacy 
interests when the effectiveness of such disclosures is uncertain.   
 First, studies on the effectiveness of Megan’s Law are scant and the few studies available 
report inconclusive results.  The inconclusive benefits to the public from mug shot disclosures 
boosts arguments for keeping mug shots private.  One commentator lamented, “[s]tate and 
federal governments have not been proactive in commissioning studies as to the effectiveness of 
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registration in preventing future sex offenses.  They have likewise failed to make inquiries into 
how these registries affect victims[.]”272 A 2008 study shows Megan’s Law had no effect on 
sexual offense recidivism in New Jersey.273 Conversely, “there is also not much proof that 
Megan’s Laws fail.”274  Thus, mug shot disclosures do not necessarily protect the safety of 
children.   
 Second, “[w]hile many assume that sex crimes are perpetrated by strangers, such as the 
mysterious neighbor who lives down the street, most sex offenses are perpetrated by family 
members or people who know the victim.”275  In fact, according to one estimate, family members 
or close family friends commit ninety-two percent of sexual offenses against children.276  Thus, 
Megan’s Law is often useless in identifying sex offenders because most parents know the sex 
offender.  Moreover, Megan’s Law also lists “harmless” offenders like high school students 
convicted for having sex with their underage boyfriends or girlfriends.277  In effect, the release of 
mug shots unnecessarily invades the privacy rights of neighbors with sexual offense convictions.   
 Unfortunately, mug shot disclosures can have unintended effects.  For instance, “Megan’s  
Laws may stigmatize the very victims of sex offenses whom they are designed to protect, many 
of whom are children living in the same house as the sex offender.”278  Research also shows that 
sex offenders lose their jobs and experience difficulty adjusting into society, which, in turn, can 
increase the likelihood that they may return to committing crimes.279  Inevitably, sex crimes will 
occur in some neighborhoods, just as any other crime.  The possibility of sex crimes, however, 	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should not always supersede laws that protect privacy, because mug shot disclosures do not 
conclusively benefit the public’s protection of children.   
 Instead of aiding the criminal justice system, mug shot disclosures provide entertainment 
fodder to the public.  Mug shots have become trendy features for publications and websites.  Jail, 
Cellmates, Busted, and Gotch-ya! are examples of publications devoted exclusively to mug 
shots.280  These publications sell for one dollar and provide “little editorial content outside 
photographs, names, and charges.”281 The Orlando Sentinel even attests that mug shot postings 
created “huge [internet] traffic” for the paper.282  In fact, the Sentinel mug shot webpage draws 
about 2.5 million views a month.283  Clearly, not all of those 2.5 million views were from crime 
victims hoping to identify crime suspects.  John Watson, a journalism professor, explained that 
viewing mug shots is akin to enjoying a horror movie.284 Specifically, “[t]hese [mug shots] are 
pictures of monsters who actually exist, and we can look at them from the safety of wherever we 
are, and they disappear when we close the book.”285 The mug shot publications essentially 
provide the kind of idle gossip that Warren and Brandeis in 1890 and Solove in the twenty-first 
century feel is a reason for keeping truthful information private.286 The public’s pleasure-
seeking, voyeuristic interests should never trump a person’s privacy interest in withholding the 
release of a mug shot. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Disclosing mug shots, even after a defendant has made a courtroom appearance, defies a  	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defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and hence, violates FOIA Exemption 7(C).  When 
the Supreme Court decides to review the split between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, the Court 
must side with the Karantsalis decision.  First, the legislative history of FOIA Exemption 7(C) is 
more aligned with the Karantsalis holding than it is with the Detroit Free Press holding.  
Second, blackmail laws, Warren and Brandeis’ famous law review article, and privacy tort law 
all point to an American legal tradition that uses privacy as a legal right to protect reputations.   
Thus, Karantsalis has a more realistic view of privacy rights than does Detroit Free Press.    
Third, social science research more heavily supports the legislative intent of FOIA Exemption 
7(C) and Karantsalis’ view of privacy rights than the views of Detroit Free Press.  Finally, the 
privacy invasions that defendants suffer from mug shot disclosures are highly shocking in 
comparison to the inconclusive benefit that the public receives from viewing mug shots.  
 Despite the strong social science support against the release of mug shots, discussions of 
privacy inevitably elicit questions on the public’s right to view mug shots.  Note that the 
Supreme Court has spelled out certain categorical standards that balance the public’s right to 
know and privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C).  For example, in Favish, the Court held that 
“[i]n the case of photographic images and other data pertaining to an individual who died under 
mysterious circumstances,”287 the requester of information protected by Exemption 7(C) must 
“establish more than a bare suspicion” of government misconduct and rather, must produce 
evidence that would “warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government 
impropriety might have occurred.”288  To address the balance between legitimate public need for 
disclosure and privacy protections under FOIA Exemption 7(C), the Supreme Court should 	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extend the Favish standard to mug shot photographs if it decides to review the split between the 
Eleventh and the Sixth Circuits.   
 In general, the law should presume that mug shot disclosures violate a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the requester of the mug shot photos puts forth 
evidence satisfying the Favish standard.  Only when the FOIA requester has met this standard 
“will there exist a counterweight on the FOIA scale for the court to balance against the 
cognizable privacy interests in the requested records.”289  Requesters of mug shot photos must 
meet this high standard of establishing “more than a bare suspicion” of government misconduct, 
because “[a]llegations of government misconduct are ‘easy to allege and hard to disprove’”290 
and thus a “meaningful evidentiary showing”291 is vital to safeguard strongly against reputational 
and privacy harms resulting from mug shot disclosures. 
 Ultimately, the reasonable expectation of privacy encompasses the right to protect one’s 
reputation.  Social science shows that “disclosures of information about a person will not 
enhance our ability to judge . . . in fact, it may distort our assessments.”292  This distortion starkly 
contrasts with FOIA’s overall goal to create openness, honesty, and transparency.  Moreover, 
reputation distortion certainly runs afoul of Exemption 7(C)’s goal to protect individuals whose 
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information appears in law enforcement records.  Mug shot disclosures are not merely 
embarrassing; they unreasonably impact a whole range of sociological factors that last beyond a 
criminal trial.   	  
